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The objective of the research is to analyze the impact of quantitative easing 
programmes conducted by the Federal Reserve from 2009 till present on US 
Treasury market liquidity. More specifically, the objective is to determine how 
the spotlight and scarcity effects affect liquidity as the relative and absolute 
share of the Federal Reserve’s US Treasury holdings changes. Another 
objective is to find a level of relative US Treasury holdings where liquidity no 




This quantitative paper analyses US 10-year Treasury’s bid-ask spreads and 
the Federal Reserve’s US Treasury holdings using regression analysis. Bid-ask 
spreads are used to measure liquidity and the Federal Reserve’s US Treasury 




This paper concludes that the second quantitative easing programme improved 
liquidity, the third had no effect and the fourth worsened liquidity after the initial 
 
 
improvement. Around 15% seems to be the share of US Treasuries the Federal 
Reserve can hold without worsening liquidity conditions. The spotlight and 
scarcity effects had an expected effect as the spotlight effect improved liquidity 
initially and the scarcity effect caused liquidity to worsen as the Federal 
Reserve increased its US Treasury holdings.  
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1.1  Background 
 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, major central banks have conducted several 
quantitative easing programs in efforts to prevent adverse financial shocks, 
boost inflation, promote lending, and ultimately investing. They have done this 
through asset purchases, buying mortgage-backed securities, government- 
and corporate bonds, and even exchange-traded funds in Japan. Another role 
of these purchases has been clearing toxic assets from bank’s balance 
sheets, improving their financial stability. This has led to the massive growth 
of central bank balance sheets. For example, the Federal Reserve’s Treasury 
holdings have grown about 1000% from about $475 000 million since 
February 2009 to $4,8 trillion in February 2021 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, 2021). This means that central banks are restricting the number of 
available treasuries and thus boosting their valuations. Central banks’ 
presence in the treasury markets is also lowering risk premiums as investors 
trust them to intervene in the markets if volatility starts to get out of control.  
 
There are also problems created by quantitative easing. One of these issues 
is worsening liquidity conditions in the government bond markets which has 
been an issue especially in Japan as the Bank of Japan’s relative bond 
holdings are larger than other central banks’ holdings. This issue emerges as 
the amount of publicly traded government bonds declines due to central bank 
purchases. This negatively impacts the depth of the market, reducing the 
government bond market’s ability to absorb large bids and offers. This is a 
serious issue as having a well-functioning treasury market is critical for the 








1.2  Research problem 
 
Global financial markets have increasingly become dependent on stimulus 
from central banks and this has forced them, including the European Central 
Bank, to buy an increasing number of assets to keep the financial markets 
stable. This has caused liquidity issues, especially in Japan, as there are not 
enough bonds available for deep and liquid markets to exist. Central bankers 
are facing a conflict between the need to support the markets with quantitative 
easing and the need to limit the portion of available assets they hold so they 
do not cause too severe market distortions and liquidity issues. 
 
To make good policy decisions, it would be useful to know how much a 
central bank can buy without causing liquidity issues. The current literature on 
this is lacking and the topic should be studied more extensively as central 
banks will likely keep using asset purchases as one of their main monetary 
policy tools.  
 
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
1) Have the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing programs improved 
or worsened liquidity conditions in the US Treasury markets?  
2) Has the effect of quantitative easing on liquidity changed as the 
Federal Reserve’s share of available bonds held has grown? 
 
 
1.4 Research objectives 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze how the Federal Reserve’s 
quantitative easing programs have affected liquidity conditions in the US 
Treasury markets. Specifically, the aim is to identify if the liquidity conditions 
have started to deteriorate after a certain threshold of the Federal Reserve’s 
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relative treasury holdings had been passed. This threshold would be the point 
where the negative scarcity effect outweighs the positive spotlight effect. The 
relationship between these two effects provides the basis for the analysis in 
this paper. 
 
The outcome of this study provides insights on quantitative easing’s expected 
liquidity effects for bond investors, policymakers, and other regulators as well 
as an up-to-date review of the current state of liquidity after the COVID-19 
related asset purchases. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This literature review’s purpose is to provide some background on the 
reasons for quantitative easing and the effects on government bonds it has 
had.  The most appropriate ways to measure liquidity in the government bond 
market are also discussed and relevant theories that explain the effects of 
large-scale asset purchases on liquidity in the government bond market are 
reviewed. 
 
The literature on quantitative easing’s liquidity effects is inconclusive, some 
seeing negative liquidity effects, especially in Japan, some seeing positive 
liquidity effects in Japan, Europe, and the US among others, and few found no 
statistically significant effects on liquidity. To explain this, two effects of 
quantitative easing are relevant: scarcity effect and spotlight effect. Great 
attention is paid to these two effects as multiple publications on bond market 
liquidity have identified them as highly important for liquidity.  
 
One of the issues is measuring liquidity as there are no universally used ways 
to measure liquidity. There are multiple ways to approximate liquidity 
conditions in financial markets, including bid-ask spreads, depth of the 
market, and liquidity premiums. There are also attempts at creating liquidity 
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scores that use multiple data points to approximate liquidity conditions in the 
government bond market. 
2.1 Effects of quantitative easing on government bond yields  
 
The biggest and most obvious effect of large-scale asset purchases is the 
price appreciation of those assets. According to the law of supply and 
demand, if the quantity available declines, the equilibrium price goes up. In 
the case of quantitative easing, a central bank greatly boosts demand for the 
assets and simultaneously restricts the amount available. This creates perfect 
conditions for price appreciation as both the demand- and supply curves 
move favorably. This appreciation has been documented by Hubert (2020). 
He finds that quantitative easing done by the European Central Bank is 
effective at reducing sovereign bond yields, and thus boosting their 
valuations, after controlling for four categories of fundamentals: 
macroeconomic, international, financial, and expectations. He claims that the 
effect is bigger for Spain and to a lesser extent Italy compared to France and 
Germany, meaning that quantitative easing is ‘effective at mitigating the 
disruption created by the sovereign debt crisis in the transmission of monetary 
policy across Eurozone countries’ (p. 1202).  He also concludes that most of 
the price movement happens right after the policy announcement with the 
open market operations having an additional effect. 
 
Blattner and Joyce (2016) come to similar conclusions in their analysis as 
they analyze quantitative easing’s effect on the government bond term 
structures of Spain, Italy, France, and Germany. Their data shows that the 
Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) was effective at lowering yields 
across the term structure with long duration bonds seeing the biggest yield 
declines and lesser effect over time (Figure 1). Blattner and Joyce (2016) also 
claim there is evidence that quantitative easing’s effects are transmitted to the 
broader economy via the yield curve. This means that the programme 




Figure 1 below shows quantitative easing’s predicted effects on 2-,5-, and 10-
year yields during the Public Sector Purchase Programme between 2015 and 
2017. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in term structures (Blattner & Joyce, 2016) 
 
 
Schlepper, Hofer, Riordan and Schrimpf, (2020) focus on the interdealer 
market in their analysis. They use both high- and low-frequency data to 
analyze quantitative easing’s effect on government bond market functioning. 
They find that asset purchases conducted by the European Central Bank 
have ‘a direct (high-frequency) impact on bond prices in the interdealer 
market’ (p. 218). Their analysis shows that the price impact of an asset 
purchase is greater when liquidity conditions are poor. They also find that the 
price impact remains at the daily frequencies, which, according to Schlepper, 
Hofer, Riordan, and Schrimpf, (2020), ‘provide evidence not only that QE 
policies have an impact on the announcement but also that the 
implementation of these policies has important effects on the market’ (p. 218)  
 
 
2.2  Measuring treasury market liquidity 
 
There are many different approaches to estimate liquidity conditions in 
financial markets with the approaches being fairly similar across asset 
classes. Some researchers have created tools for tracking liquidity that have 
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several components that correlate with liquidity conditions. One of these 
liquidity scores was created by Choudhry (2010). He uses 14 different 
components with 3 different weights, including bid-ask spreads, market size, 
and the level of FTSE100 to measure liquidity in the gilt market. He suggests 
that this tool would be useful for obtaining a measure of relative liquidity in any 
stock or bond market, supporting the claim that liquidity can be measured with 
similar metrics across asset classes. 
 
 
2.2.1 Bid-ask spread 
 
The bid-ask spread is useful for measuring and tracking liquidity in the U.S 
Treasury market as concluded by Fleming (2001). He states that bid-ask 
spreads correlate strongly with more sophisticated price impact (liquidity) 
measures. Fleming (2001) also claims that compared to bid-ask spreads, 
other popular proxies like quote size, trade size, and the on-the-run/off-the-run 
yield spreads correlate only modestly with liquidity conditions. 
 
Bid-ask spreads are commonly used to measure liquidity in the literature, for 
example by Christensen and Gillan (2013), Iwatsubo and Taishi (2018), 
Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tobe, and Uno, (2018), as well as Schuster and 
Uhrig-Homburg (2012). 
 
Corwin and Schultz (2012) have created a formula that estimates bid-ask 
spreads from daily high and low prices. They claim that the spreads 
calculated with the formula have a correlation of 0,9 with the actual spreads 
and ‘the standard deviation of high-low spread estimates is one-fourth to one-
half as large as the standard deviation of estimates from the popular Roll 
(1984) covariance spread estimator’ (Corwin & Schultz (2012:719). This 
formula is widely used in the relevant literature as it allows researchers to use 
bid-ask spreads even though there may be insufficient bid-ask data available 




Bid-ask spreads can be used to measure the liquidity of different bonds as 
well as across different asset classes as the trading of all kinds of securities is 
based on the same principle of bidding and offering. This makes the bid-ask 
spread a useful and versatile proxy for liquidity. 
 
 
2.1.2 Depth of the market 
 
Market depth (order book depth) is among the bid-ask spread one of the most 
important liquidity measures. It considers the number and size of standing 
offers and bids at various price levels around the equilibrium price. The bigger 
the amount and value of those bids and offers, the better the market can 
absorb large bids and offers without price movement, and thus the market is 
more liquid. Schlepper, Hofer, Riordan, and Schrimpf (2017) find that 
European Central Bank’s Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) has 
affected order book depth negatively, leading to weaker liquidity conditions 
and wider bid-ask spreads (Figure 2). This conclusion is intuitive as it is 
logical that the number of bids and offers is lower as the number of available 
bonds in the market declines.  
 




Lennkh, Bartels, and Vasse (2019) analyze quantitative easing’s effect on 
different investor bases’ bond holdings. They found that central banks have 
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‘mostly displaced traditional domestic (not foreign) investor base of banks and 
institutional investors’ (p. 1). This supports the idea that having fewer 
investors in the market has had a negative effect on the depth of the market 
as volumes and trading frequencies are lower. 
 
 
2.3 The term structure of bond liquidity 
 
When studying bond markets and liquidity, taking the term structure of bond 
liquidity into account is important as changes in the yield curve tell a lot about 
the economy and affect many parts of the financial world. Another crucial role 
of government bond markets, especially the US Treasury market, is the 
indication of the risk-free rate. The liquidity of those markets is important 
because it affects efficient asset allocation and price discovery (Goyenko, 
Subrahmanyam, & Ukhov, 2011). Liquidity conditions affect term structures 
through liquidity premiums as investors demand additional value when they 
invest in illiquid assets. 
 
They study liquidity in the US Treasury markets across maturities and both 
on-the-run and off-the-run bonds and find that while illiquidity increases 
across the whole yield curve during recessions, the increase is especially 
pronounced for short-term bonds. Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov, 
(2011) also find that while on-the-run illiquidity is mostly only affected by 
volatility, off-the-run illiquidity is affected by various economic factors. They 
conclude that ‘off-the-run illiquidity is the primary source of return 
forecastability (and thus, the liquidity premium) in the Treasury market’ (p. 
137). 
 
Since this paper is about quantitative easing, taking a look at bond market 
liquidity during crises is appropriate. Schuster and Uhrig-Homburg (2012) 
study illiquidity premiums during different economic environments and find 
that ‘the term structure of illiquidity premiums varies over time and is strongly 
dependent on the general financial and economic situation’ (p. 2). They also 
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find that illiquidity premiums only react significantly to fundamentals during 
crises. 
2.4 Spotlight effect 
 
The leading research paper on the spotlight effect is done by Pelizzon, 
Subrahmanyam, Tobe, and Uno (2018). In the paper, they analyze the effects 
of quantitative easing done by the Bank of Japan by focusing on two effects: 
spotlight effect and scarcity effect. They analyze both short- and long-term 
effects of Bank of Japan’s open market operations on bond yields and 
liquidity.  
 
The spotlight effect happens when a large unidirectional buyer, like a central 
bank, starts buying certain securities in the market. The effects of quantitative 
easing’s spotlight effect include price appreciation and improvements in 
liquidity for the targeted assets (Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tobe, & Uno, 
2018). They claim that the spotlight effect’s impact on liquidity is immediate as 
the presence of an aggressive buyer ‘makes bond holders easy to sell their 
bonds to dealers’ and ‘increases competition among dealers which leads to 
tightening the bid-ask spread’ (p. 1). However, this positive liquidity effect isn’t 
long-lasting as ‘an aggressive QE program can eventually worsen the market 
liquidity and increased market impacts in the sovereign bond market while it 
improves liquidity at the inception’ (Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tobe, & Uno, 
2018:30). 
 
Christensen and Gillan (2013) come to similar conclusions as they analyze 
the liquidity effects of Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) 
purchases during the Federal Reserve’s QE2 program. Their regression 
analysis shows that TIPS purchases temporarily improved liquidity conditions, 
but the effect only lasted ‘as long as QE purchases are ongoing and expected 
to continue’ (p. 31). They only find liquidity effects in the targeted securities, 





Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tobe, and Uno (2018) also say that the spotlight 
effect does not take place before the actual purchases as the Bank of Japan 
does not announce the specific securities it intends to buy. Pelizzon, 
Subrahmanyam, Tobe, and Uno (2018) say: ‘The list of target bonds that the 
BoJ announces for each auction includes more than 90% of the existing 
bonds in the targeted maturity bucket, but only one-third of the bonds on the 
target list are eventually purchased’ (p. 3). 
 
 
2.5 Scarcity effect 
 
Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tobe, and Uno (2018) say that Bank of Japan’s 
large-scale asset purchases have, on top of the effect on yields and 
immediate positive effect on the liquidity of targeted assets, affected bond 
market liquidity negatively over the long-term. They argue that the reason for 
this is the scarcity effect, which happens when the available bond supply in 
the market shrinks, negatively affecting market functioning and liquidity 
conditions. This could explain why the literature on bond market liquidity is 
heavily focused on Japan, as the Bank of Japan holds the biggest share of 
sovereign bonds in the world (Fuijoka & Ito, 2020). 
 
Han and Seneviratne (2018) come to similar conclusions on their research as 
they find ‘strong evidence of the scarcity (flow) effects of QE in market 
liquidity’ (p. 30). Using bid-ask spreads they find that quantitative easing had a 
significant negative effect on market liquidity across the Japanese 
government bond market. They also find evidence that the scarcity effect 
depends on the Bank of Japan’s level of holdings. Their analysis shows that 
quantitative easing initially improved liquidity conditions, but the effect turned 
negative as the Bank of Japan’s holdings exceeded certain thresholds (Figure 
3). Bank of Japan was successful at mitigating adverse effects on liquidity 
conditions with its SLF program (Han. & Seneviratne, 2018), which is a 
repurchase agreement type lending facility that provides Japanese 
government securities to the market. This has since been confirmed by Hattori 
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(2019) as he states that having an auction system for older, less liquid bonds 
overwhelmingly improved liquidity condition in the Japanese government bond 
market. A need for a facility like that suggests that the Japanese bond market 
is suffering from illiquidity. 
 
Figure 3: Market liquidity and Central Banks' Holdings of Domestic Sovereign Debt Securities, 




One of the interesting findings Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tobe, and Uno 
(2018) discover was that against theoretical expectations, ‘Illiquidity caused 
by scarcity amplifies the yield decline rather than adding to the illiquidity 
premium’ (p. 0). 
 
 
2.6 Importance of communication from the central banks 
 
Forward guidance has become an important tool for central banks for setting 
market expectations for future monetary policy decisions and by doing so, 
reducing volatility and large price movements after the actual policy 
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announcements. Campbell (2019) studies the Federal Reserve’s ability to 
manage expectations about future interest rates and finds that while not 
having perfect control over the expectations it remains an effective monetary 
policy tool. Campbell (2019) also says that miscommunication by a central 
bank ‘feeds macroeconomic volatility and can challenge the central bank’s 
ability to stabilize the economy’ (p. 131). 
 
Despite forward guidance grabbing the most attention, more subtle ways of 
communication are important for well-functioning markets as well. Iwatsubo 
and Taishi (2018) study the market liquidity effects the Bank of Japan’s 
purchase policy change in April 2013 had. Among other changes, the Bank of 
Japan started to announce a broad purchasing pattern. They found that by 
easing investors’ expectations on the timing and amount of future open 
market operations the Bank of Japan was able to significantly improve market 
liquidity. Iwatsubo and Taishi (2018) conclude that ‘central banks’ 
communication and transparency play an important role in large-scale 
government bond purchases in terms of market liquidity’ (p. 474). 
 
 
2.7 Conceptual framework 
 
The purpose of this paper is to answer two questions. The first question being 
if the quantitative easing programs done by the Federal Reserve have 
improved or deteriorated liquidity conditions in the US Treasury market. The 
second question is if the quantitative easing’s liquidity effects have changed 
as the Federal Reserve’s relative share of bonds held has grown. The 
outcome of the analysis depends on if the negative scarcity effect has 










In this chapter, data is analyzed using regression and it is explained why 
these datasets were chosen. This analysis is quantitative as all of the data is 
strictly numerical and does not include opinions or other types of data with 





The hypothesis is that quantitative easing initially improves liquidity through 
the spotlight effect, which shows as tightening bid-ask spreads. After a certain 
threshold, the scarcity effect becomes dominant and liquidity starts to 




The null hypothesis would then be that the Federal Reserve’s US Treasury 





This paper attempts to find a correlation between the value of the Federal 
Reserve’s US Treasury holdings and the US Treasury market’s liquidity. 
According to Fleming (2001), bid-ask spreads are effective at approximating 
liquidity conditions in US Treasury markets. This is why the bid-ask spread of 
a 10-year on-the-run US Treasury’s yield was chosen as a liquidity indicator.  
 
A linear regression model was chosen as most appropriate even though the 
bid-ask spread is expected to create a U-shaped graph as a function of the 
Federal Reserve’s US Treasury holdings. This is because one of the 
objectives is to find if the liquidity effect changes as the Federal Reserve’s 
relative US Treasury holdings grow. By using a linear model and analyzing 
each quantitative easing programme individually it is possible to get a 
reasonably close approximation of each quantitative easing programme’s 
impact on liquidity. 
 
Reliability analysis will be done using the Gauss-Markov theorem. Five 













3.3 Data collection 
 
The data for this paper comes from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED), 
Bloomberg, and Investing.com. To analyze quantitative easing’s effects on 
bond market liquidity, data on the US 10-year on-the-run bond’s bid-ask 
spreads and the Federal Reserve’s holdings of US Treasuries maturing in 5 to 
10 years are analyzed using regression. The data is from the beginning of 
2009 to 26.2.2021 and it covers all the quantitative easing programs 
conducted by the Federal Reserve to date. However, only data during 
quantitative easing programmes 1-4 is analyzed.  
 
The bid-ask spread data on the US 10-year Treasury yield is used as an 
indicator of general liquidity conditions in the US Treasury markets. A maturity 
of 10 years was chosen because of its importance in the financial markets. 
The bid-ask spread is the dependent variable.   
 
The Federal Reserve’s holdings of US Treasuries with a maturity between 5 
and 10 years is used as a proxy for quantitative easing. The Federal 
Reserve’s total US Treasury holdings and its holdings of Treasuries with 
maturities between 5 and 10 years haven’t always moved in tandem. This is 
due to changes in average maturities of purchased Treasuries. During and 
after quantitative easing programme 3 the Federal Reserve moved its focus 
on securities with maturities of over 10 years, causing its holdings of US 
Treasuries with maturities between 5 and 10 years to decrease during 
quantitative easing programme 3. Despite this, the Federal Reserve’s 
holdings of US Treasuries with maturities between 5 and 10 years are used 
as this paper focuses its analysis on the spotlight effect. Unfortunately, data 








3.4 Data analysis 
 
Four periods between 2009 and 2021 are analysed: 13.3.2009-26.3.2010 
(QE1), 29.10.2010-29.6.2012 (QE2), 1.4.2013-31.10.2014 (QE3), and 
23.3.2020-26.2.2021 (QE4). 
 
Quantitative easing programme 1 
 
The first quantitative easing programme had no significant effect on bid-ask 
spreads as it was relatively small compared to latter programmes and focused 
on mortgage-backed securities instead of US Treasuries. During the 
programme, the Federal Reserve bought US Treasuries that were worth $300 
Billion, out of which $114 Billion had a maturity between 5 and 10 years. 
 
 
Figure 4: US 10-year Treasury's bid-ask spread and the FED's holdings of US Treasuries with 
maturities between 5 and 10 years (Quantitative easing programme 1), (Federal Reserve of St. 
Louis, 2021) 
 
No statistically significant correlation was found using regression analysis as 
the p-value was 0,66. The 10-year bond’s bid-ask spread stayed constant 
between 0,003 and 0,004 during the whole programme. One of the challenges 
with using bid-ask spreads is the lack of fine changes in the spread. Every 
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move in the spread is over 10%, leading to a situation where small changes in 
the independent variable don’t show in the dependent variable.  
 
 
Figure 5: Regression Statistics for QE1 
 
 
Quantitative easing programme 2 
 
The Federal Reserve bought $872 billion in US Treasuries during this 
programme, out of which $502 billion had a maturity between 5 and 10 years. 
The chart below shows that while the effect was not immediate, the spread 





Figure 6 US 10-year Treasury's bid-ask spread and the FED's holdings of US Treasuries with 
maturities between 5 and 10 years (Quantitative easing programme 2), (Federal Reserve of St. 
Louis, 2021) 
 
Out of the four programmes, the second one had the biggest impact on 
market liquidity as the 10-year bond’s bid-ask spread tightened from 0,004 to 
0,002 during the programme. Regression analysis suggests a statistically 
significant correlation with R Square being at 0,507. This means that about 
51% of the move in the spread is due to the change in the Federal Reserve’s 
Treasury holdings. This result can be considered reliable as the p-value is 
close to zero at 7,28*10^(-15).  
 
As the R Square and P-value suggest statistical significance, reliability will be 







This scatter plot shows that the data is linear, though with considerable error 
terms. The data interval is weekly and there should be no sampling errors as 
data is used evenly from the whole period analyzed. Collinearity is not a 
problem as the two variables used are clearly not 100% correlated. This data 
could have some issues with exogeneity because illiquidity events in the US 
Treasury markets have forced the Federal Reserve to take action in the form 
of quantitative easing. This should not be a major issue because the Federal 
Reserve’s quantitative easing programmes are mostly influenced by 
macroeconomic variables. The data seems to be homoscedastic because the 





Figure 7: Regression Statistics for QE2 
 
The regression equation thus is Y(bid-ask spread)=0,005966069-5,91645E-
09*X(US Treasuries held (5-10 years) in millions of dollars) 
 
 
Quantitative easing programme 3  
 
The third quantitative easing programme had no impact on the 10-year bond’s 
bid-ask spreads. There are two likely reasons for this. The first one being that 
the spread was extremely tight before the programme and didn’t have space 
to move lower. The second reason is that during the quantitative easing 
programme 3 the Federal Reserve mainly bought Treasuries with maturities 
over 10 years. Even though the Federal Reserve’s total US Treasury holdings 
grew roughly by $808 billion during the programme, its holdings of US 
Treasuries with maturities between 5 and 10 years fell by $136 billion. This 





Figure 8: US 10-year Treasury's bid-ask spread and the FED's holdings of US Treasuries with 




Figure 9: Regression Statistics for QE3 
 
Quantitative easing programme 4 
 
Analyzing any financial data from 2020 onwards is challenging due to COVID-
19 and this is no exception. It is noteworthy that even though the Federal 
Reserve grew its US Treasury holdings by over $2,2 trillion between 
23.3.2020 and 26.2.2021, it could not push bid-ask spreads down like during 
the quantitative easing programme 2. At this point, it is early to make a 
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judgment on whether or not the Federal Reserve’s ability to improve liquidity 
with quantitative easing has diminished as no statistically significant 
correlations were found between liquidity and quantitative easing during 
quantitative easing programmes 3 and 4. Figure 10 still supports the claim 
that the scarcity effect has started to become dominant as the spreads seem 
to widen after the initial tightening. Another observation supporting the case 
for the scarcity effect is the lack of US Treasury market volatility during the 
COVID-19 crisis and quantitative easing programme 4. In practice, this means 
that the large fluctuations in the bid-ask spread during quantitative easing 
programme 4 can not be explained with higher volatility (figure 11). This 
further supports the case that the Federal Reserve’s ability to improve liquidity 




Figure 10: US 10-year Treasury's bid-ask spread and the FED's holdings of US Treasuries with 





Figure 11: US Treasury market volatility index (Investing.com, 2021) 
 
 
Figure 12: Regression Statistics for QE4 
 
 
Below is a chart that shows the Federal Reserve’s share of US Treasuries 
(Figure 13). This has been calculated by dividing the Federal Reserve’s total 
US Treasury holdings with total US federal debt. The latest available data on 
US federal debt is from 3Q2020 and at that time the Federal Reserve held 
16% of all US Treasuries. Han and Seneviratne (2018) found in their research 
that as the central bank’s relative holdings grow from 0% to 10%, liquidity 
improves. Between 10% and 15% liquidity is at its highest level and after 15% 





Figure 13: The Federal Reserve's relative US Treasury holdings, (Federal Reserve of St. Louis, 
2021) 
 
During quantitative easing programme 1, the Federal Reserve’s relative US 
Treasury holdings grew from 4% to 6% which can be considered a minor 
change relative to later changes in holdings. It seems that this was not 
enough to tighten the bid-ask spread. During quantitative easing programme 
2, the Federal Reserve’s holdings grew substantially more, from 6% to around 
11%. Han and Seneviratne (2018) find that liquidity improves until a central 
bank’s relative holdings exceed 10%. Their research provides strong support 
for the claim that the improvement in liquidity during quantitative easing 
programme 2 was due to the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing 
programmes and the subsequent spotlight effect.  
 
During quantitative easing programme 3, the Federal Reserve’s relative 
holdings grew from 10% to 14%. According to Han and Seneviratne (2018) 
liquidity remains good but no longer improves at those levels. The results are 
consistent with their claims. This suggests that liquidity did not improve during 
quantitative easing programme 3 due to increasing negative scarcity effects. 
As the Federal Reserve’s relative holdings grew from 10% to 16% during 
quantitative easing programme 4, spreads fluctuated between 0,001 and 
0,005 after coming down from 0,007. It seems like that at the beginning of 
quantitative easing programme 4 intervention from the Federal Reserve 
25 
 
eased panic and led to tighter spreads. After the initial intervention, spreads 
started to widen towards 0,005 as the Federal Reserve’s holdings exceeded 
15%.  
 
US 10-year Treasury’s liquidity has followed the projected line Han and 
Seneviratne (2018) plotted in figure 3. This suggests that the size of the 
Federal Reserve’s relative US Treasury holdings has an impact on US 
Treasury liquidity and that spotlight and scarcity effects drive changes in 
liquidity. Schlepper, Hofer, Riordan, and Schrimpf (2020) also found that 
central bank asset purchases likely caused deterioration in the Bund market. 
This strongly supports the hypothesis that after the initial improvement in 





Results from the data analysis suggest that the spotlight effect improved 
liquidity conditions during quantitative easing programme 2. This is a similar 
result Christensen and Gillan (2013) came to in their research. It is also likely 
that the growth in the Federal Reserve’s total US Treasury holdings helped to 
keep the spreads tight during quantitative easing programme 3 despite the 
lack of purchases of Treasuries with maturities between 5 and 10 years. 
During quantitative easing programme 4, the spread did not tighten to levels 
seen during the second and third programmes. This was likely due to the 
scarcity effect as the US Treasury market volatility has stayed subdued  
 
Findings from the data analysis were consistent with research done by Han 
and Seneviratne (2018). There was a clear trend that emerged as the Federal 
Reserve’s relative US Treasury holdings grew: the second programme had a 
large positive effect on liquidity, the third programme had no significant effect 
on liquidity and liquidity worsened during the fourth programme. This trend 
supports the argument that the scarcity effect causes worsening liquidity 




There are also limitations to the analysis as statistically significant correlations 
were found only when analyzing the second quantitative easing programme. 
Since the analysis on the scarcity effect relies mostly on visual interpretations 
and lacks robustness, comments on the scarcity effect and its impact on 
liquidity should be considered more as speculation rather than claims made 






5.1 Main Findings 
 
This study shows that the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing programmes 
have affected the US Treasury market’s liquidity. The effect was initially 
positive as the Federal Reserve increased its relative US Treasury holdings 
from 6% to 11% during quantitative easing programme 2. During this period 
the spotlight effect was dominant over the scarcity effect. During the 
quantitative easing programme, 3 liquidity remained good but did not improve 
further as the Federal Reserve’s relative holdings grew from 10% to 14%. 
Quantitative easing programme 4 failed to improve liquidity as the past 
programmes did as the Federal Reserve’s relative holdings grew from 10% to 
16%. 
 
Results suggest that the scarcity effect becomes dominant as the Federal 
Reserve’s relative holdings grow to around 15%. This means that while further 
asset purchases may support price stability, they would also cause further 







5.2 Implications for International Business 
 
These findings suggest that all US Treasury holders, most importantly 
institutional investors that utilize high-frequency trading, should prepare for 
less liquid US Treasury markets. In extreme scenarios similar to the Japanese 
situation other securities should be considered if liquidity is a critical property.  
 
Policymakers should be very cautious about increasing the Federal Reserve’s 
relative holdings further to keep the US Treasury market liquid and well-
functioning. One of the key roles of US Treasuries is acting as collateral in 
various transactions and financing solutions. Adequate liquidity is critical for 
any collateral and if quantitative easing is taken to extremes, the Federal 
Reserve could risk compromising US Treasuries’ position as the most 
preferred collateral. This could at least, in theory, lead to even worse liquidity 
as trading volumes would suffer.  
 
 
5.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Repeating this study after the quantitative easing programme 4 is finished and 
the COVID-19 pandemic has been defeated could provide clearer results on 
the role the scarcity effect had on the lack of liquidity improvements during 
quantitative easing programme 4. Analysis of off-the-run bonds could also 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the US Treasury market’s 
liquidity conditions. Using the Federal Reserve’s holdings of 10-year US 
Treasuries could provide more precise information on the impact of the 
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Start Date 1.1.2009    
End Date     
 US    
 GT10 Govt    
 Bid Price Ask Price   
Dates PX_BID PX_ASK Securities held 5-10yrs Securities held all 
1.2.2009 2,372 2,369 97280 475718 
1.9.2009 2,393 2,39 96462 475515 
1/16/2009 2,322 2,319 97383 475322 
1/23/2009 2,621 2,617 97338 475129 
1/30/2009 2,844 2,84 97304 474982 
2.6.2009 2,995 2,992 97278 474869 
2/13/2009 2,893 2,889 99442 474756 
2/20/2009 2,791 2,788 99416 474643 
2/27/2009 3,017 3,013 100588 474619 
3.6.2009 2,875 2,872 100598 474661 
3/13/2009 2,894 2,89 100928 474704 
3/20/2009 2,638 2,634 100938 474746 
3/27/2009 2,761 2,757 109586 492330 
4.3.2009 2,889 2,885 109906 508414 
4.10.2009 2,926 2,923 110944 526103 
4/17/2009 2,949 2,945 117956 534969 
4/24/2009 2,994 2,99 118003 549046 
5.1.2009 3,157 3,153 127410 560601 
5.8.2009 3,289 3,286 127416 577091 
5/15/2009 3,138 3,134 128320 583271 
5/22/2009 3,453 3,45 137233 600142 
5/29/2009 3,463 3,459 138134 606168 
6.5.2009 3,832 3,828 153118 628690 
6.12.2009 3,796 3,792 153325 638668 
6/19/2009 3,785 3,781 166750 653193 
6/26/2009 3,54 3,536 174540 663470 
7.3.2009 3,502 3,498 177120 673500 
7.10.2009 3,306 3,303 176253 684030 
7/17/2009 3,647 3,643 183943 692726 
7/24/2009 3,662 3,658 183950 695758 
7/31/2009 3,483 3,48 184669 705331 
8.7.2009 3,854 3,85 192654 728974 
8/14/2009 3,573 3,569 200217 736086 
8/21/2009 3,569 3,565 200238 744878 
8/28/2009 3,449 3,446 201095 752841 
9.4.2009 3,442 3,438 206041 757772 
9.11.2009 3,351 3,347 206079 759803 
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9/18/2009 3,467 3,463 206625 765633 
9/25/2009 3,322 3,318 207135 769160 
10.2.2009 3,222 3,219 207140 769185 
10.9.2009 3,384 3,38 210095 773460 
10/16/2009 3,415 3,412 210312 773486 
10/23/2009 3,494 3,49 210318 774561 
10/30/2009 3,387 3,383 211085 776512 
11.6.2009 3,501 3,497 211087 776520 
11/13/2009 3,421 3,418 211684 776527 
11/20/2009 3,369 3,366 211686 776535 
11/27/2009 3,209 3,205 212649 776543 
12.4.2009 3,476 3,472 212651 776554 
12.11.2009 3,554 3,55 212766 776565 
12/18/2009 3,541 3,537 212769 776576 
12/25/2009 3,807 3,803 212771 776587 
1.1.2010 3,839 3,835 213721 776595 
1.8.2010 3,834 3,83 213723 776603 
1/15/2010 3,678 3,674 214776 776611 
1/22/2010 3,611 3,607 214778 776619 
1/29/2010 3,588 3,584 215298 776614 
2.5.2010 3,569 3,565 215293 776592 
2.12.2010 3,697 3,693 213266 776571 
2/19/2010 3,776 3,773 213261 776549 
2/26/2010 3,615 3,612 214048 776553 
3.5.2010 3,683 3,68 214057 776591 
3.12.2010 3,704 3,701 214314 776629 
3/19/2010 3,693 3,689 214323 776667 
3/26/2010 3,851 3,847 215414 776705 
4.2.2010 3,949 3,945 215415 776708 
4.9.2010 3,886 3,882 215415 776711 
4/16/2010 3,766 3,763 217540 776714 
4/23/2010 3,813 3,809 217541 776717 
4/30/2010 3,657 3,653 218232 776749 
5.7.2010 3,429 3,425 218243 776792 
5/14/2010 3,457 3,453 213483 776834 
5/21/2010 3,242 3,238 213494 776877 
5/28/2010 3,296 3,292 214177 776913 
6.4.2010 3,206 3,202 214182 776932 
6.11.2010 3,238 3,235 214308 776951 
6/18/2010 3,223 3,22 214313 776970 
6/25/2010 3,111 3,108 215211 776989 
7.2.2010 2,981 2,977 215213 776997 
7.9.2010 3,056 3,052 214982 777005 
7/16/2010 2,925 2,922 214994 777013 
7/23/2010 2,998 2,994 214996 777021 
7/30/2010 2,909 2,905 215947 777019 
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8.6.2010 2,82 2,817 215945 777009 
8/13/2010 2,675 2,672 216083 779549 
8/20/2010 2,614 2,611 219689 784498 
8/27/2010 2,648 2,645 220725 786283 
9.3.2010 2,701 2,697 221947 789894 
9.10.2010 2,795 2,792 225683 794646 
9/17/2010 2,741 2,737 231228 805107 
9/24/2010 2,609 2,605 232855 811669 
10.1.2010 2,513 2,51 238962 819072 
10.8.2010 2,396 2,392 238966 821156 
10/15/2010 2,563 2,56 246208 832121 
10/22/2010 2,558 2,554 246571 837848 
10/29/2010 2,603 2,599 247169 842008 
11.5.2010 2,534 2,53 254262 853041 
11.12.2010 2,791 2,787 259205 873618 
11/19/2010 2,875 2,871 276741 901238 
11/26/2010 2,87 2,866 278938 917451 
12.3.2010 3,009 3,005 297233 949612 
12.10.2010 3,323 3,319 314299 967553 
12/17/2010 3,332 3,328 332496 1007237 
12/24/2010 3,397 3,393 332500 1016102 
12/31/2010 3,297 3,294 342546 1030985 
1.7.2011 3,328 3,324 359108 1062061 
1/14/2011 3,327 3,323 368756 1079578 
1/21/2011 3,408 3,404 386665 1114448 
1/28/2011 3,325 3,321 396918 1138166 
2.4.2011 3,64 3,636 414155 1167087 
2.11.2011 3,633 3,629 418498 1190341 
2/18/2011 3,584 3,58 435528 1213425 
2/25/2011 3,416 3,412 436109 1236258 
3.4.2011 3,494 3,49 452158 1266069 
3.11.2011 3,406 3,402 460397 1280386 
3/18/2011 3,271 3,268 469854 1305239 
3/25/2011 3,443 3,439 478796 1333445 
4.1.2011 3,446 3,442 488876 1358207 
4.8.2011 3,581 3,577 496992 1374695 
4/15/2011 3,412 3,408 505786 1402494 
4/22/2011 3,394 3,391 513052 1413467 
4/29/2011 3,29 3,286 517652 1441855 
5.6.2011 3,15 3,146 525568 1466209 
5/13/2011 3,172 3,171 532102 1495166 
5/20/2011 3,147 3,145 546030 1519327 
5/27/2011 3,075 3,074 539335 1532236 
6.3.2011 2,988 2,986 554021 1554660 
6.10.2011 2,971 2,969 565620 1575939 
6/17/2011 2,946 2,944 580703 1601963 
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6/24/2011 2,865 2,864 585665 1617060 
7.1.2011 3,184 3,182 581824 1624515 
7.8.2011 3,029 3,027 582548 1630414 
7/15/2011 2,908 2,906 579576 1634093 
7/22/2011 2,964 2,962 582718 1638161 
7/29/2011 2,798 2,796 577458 1640919 
8.5.2011 2,561 2,558 580770 1644743 
8.12.2011 2,257 2,255 576091 1647633 
8/19/2011 2,065 2,062 581599 1648435 
8/26/2011 2,193 2,19 579727 1652113 
9.2.2011 1,993 1,986 579731 1655599 
9.9.2011 1,921 1,918 583081 1658960 
9/16/2011 2,05 2,048 583686 1663105 
9/23/2011 1,835 1,833 583690 1664655 
9/30/2011 1,917 1,915 583799 1671784 
10.7.2011 2,08 2,076 583824 1668766 
10/14/2011 2,25 2,248 593316 1670256 
10/21/2011 2,221 2,219 607404 1678012 
10/28/2011 2,319 2,317 603320 1654195 
11.4.2011 2,035 2,033 612962 1668111 
11.11.2011 2,059 2,056 604361 1675836 
11/18/2011 2,012 2,01 633612 1664795 
11/25/2011 1,966 1,964 631158 1672038 
12.2.2011 2,035 2,033 636050 1675034 
12.9.2011 2,063 2,061 640704 1673475 
12/16/2011 1,849 1,847 655879 1684249 
12/23/2011 2,026 2,024 660486 1672092 
12/30/2011 1,878 1,876 650850 1663438 
1.6.2012 1,96 1,958 655779 1650843 
1/13/2012 1,865 1,864 659004 1651506 
1/20/2012 2,026 2,025 673510 1661529 
1/27/2012 1,893 1,891 672891 1662459 
2.3.2012 1,924 1,922 677832 1660692 
2.10.2012 1,988 1,986 680651 1667071 
2/17/2012 2,003 2,002 688526 1656581 
2/24/2012 1,977 1,976 687885 1661601 
3.2.2012 1,976 1,974 691931 1659279 
3.9.2012 2,03 2,028 697055 1659768 
3/16/2012 2,296 2,294 707665 1663484 
3/23/2012 2,233 2,232 711708 1664911 
3/30/2012 2,212 2,209 711791 1669371 
4.6.2012 2,056 2,054 721325 1681093 
4/13/2012 1,984 1,982 729715 1672141 
4/20/2012 1,965 1,963 739042 1667766 
4/27/2012 1,937 1,935 732932 1667630 
5.4.2012 1,88 1,879 737699 1665939 
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5.11.2012 1,839 1,838 723863 1656793 
5/18/2012 1,724 1,723 730251 1656824 
5/25/2012 1,74 1,738 723850 1656675 
6.1.2012 1,454 1,452 738207 1664292 
6.8.2012 1,637 1,635 738221 1660158 
6/15/2012 1,579 1,577 745173 1663577 
6/22/2012 1,676 1,674 754623 1666530 
6/29/2012 1,647 1,645 749237 1666375 
7.6.2012 1,551 1,549 754329 1662637 
7/13/2012 1,489 1,488 757892 1648694 
7/20/2012 1,458 1,457 767379 1651432 
7/27/2012 1,548 1,546 770462 1649294 
8.3.2012 1,565 1,563 779572 1652416 
8.10.2012 1,659 1,657 766034 1646360 
8/17/2012 1,812 1,81 773527 1637152 
8/24/2012 1,688 1,687 778166 1639413 
8/31/2012 1,55 1,548 785689 1648862 
9.7.2012 1,67 1,668 790418 1650851 
9/14/2012 1,868 1,866 799787 1646098 
9/21/2012 1,755 1,753 804516 1648403 
9/28/2012 1,635 1,634 809358 1652944 
10.5.2012 1,745 1,743 814098 1653737 
10.12.2012 1,658 1,656 823918 1659084 
10/19/2012 1,765 1,763 823944 1646524 
10/26/2012 1,747 1,745 826698 1645334 
11.2.2012 1,716 1,715 836554 1651289 
11.9.2012 1,608 1,606 836409 1656833 
11/16/2012 1,582 1,58 844439 1650489 
11/23/2012 1,692 1,69 844457 1646645 
11/30/2012 1,616 1,616 846751 1653593 
12.7.2012 1,623 1,622 856457 1660807 
12/14/2012 1,703 1,701 866018 1658851 
12/21/2012 1,765 1,762 866016 1656930 
12/28/2012 1,703 1,701 862403 1666118 
1.4.2013 1,901 1,899 866089 1676307 
1.11.2013 1,869 1,868 871522 1688886 
1/18/2013 1,843 1,842 874860 1696691 
1/25/2013 1,951 1,949 871745 1710058 
2.1.2013 2,017 2,015 874956 1717182 
2.8.2013 1,952 1,95 881896 1728477 
2/15/2013 2,003 2,002 880077 1736456 
2/22/2013 1,964 1,962 872989 1749545 
3.1.2013 1,843 1,841 876335 1761763 
3.8.2013 2,044 2,043 880024 1769987 
3/15/2013 1,991 1,989 887601 1784652 
3/22/2013 1,927 1,925 894432 1794459 
36 
 
3/29/2013 1,85 1,849 882819 1805639 
4.5.2013 1,714 1,713 886581 1814482 
4.12.2013 1,723 1,721 889937 1825042 
4/19/2013 1,707 1,705 897077 1836227 
4/26/2013 1,665 1,663 882001 1847983 
5.3.2013 1,74 1,738 885318 1854334 
5.10.2013 1,899 1,897 867351 1864508 
5/17/2013 1,952 1,951 871918 1877154 
5/24/2013 2,01 2,008 875579 1883559 
5/31/2013 2,13 2,128 863091 1898010 
6.7.2013 2,174 2,172 866763 1906079 
6/14/2013 2,131 2,129 872792 1918706 
6/21/2013 2,533 2,531 879602 1928416 
6/28/2013 2,488 2,486 870969 1942678 
7.5.2013 2,741 2,739 876672 1952529 
7.12.2013 2,584 2,582 879318 1961671 
7/19/2013 2,486 2,484 886154 1970003 
7/26/2013 2,564 2,562 869614 1982407 
8.2.2013 2,598 2,596 874709 1993375 
8.9.2013 2,58 2,578 855332 2001093 
8/16/2013 2,827 2,825 871934 2012169 
8/23/2013 2,816 2,815 875158 2023610 
8/30/2013 2,787 2,784 864316 2033290 
9.6.2013 2,936 2,934 867686 2041088 
9/13/2013 2,886 2,885 874742 2052055 
9/20/2013 2,736 2,734 881740 2062004 
9/27/2013 2,626 2,624 880754 2076927 
10.4.2013 2,647 2,645 887608 2086741 
10.11.2013 2,689 2,687 889601 2095034 
10/18/2013 2,58 2,578 896444 2106475 
10/25/2013 2,511 2,509 882128 2117750 
11.1.2013 2,624 2,622 885851 2125552 
11.8.2013 2,75 2,748 891277 2137037 
11/15/2013 2,705 2,703 867998 2150957 
11/22/2013 2,745 2,743 871174 2163666 
11/29/2013 2,746 2,744 858356 2169788 
12.6.2013 2,857 2,855 864707 2185719 
12/13/2013 2,866 2,865 871606 2197292 
12/20/2013 2,89 2,889 877403 2208829 
12/27/2013 3,002 3 864700 2208775 
1.3.2014 2,998 2,995 867504 2212924 
1.10.2014 2,86 2,858 868862 2220953 
1/17/2014 2,821 2,819 874124 2231430 
1/24/2014 2,717 2,715 883213 2243176 
1/31/2014 2,646 2,644 880024 2252973 
2.7.2014 2,685 2,683 885261 2261099 
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2/14/2014 2,745 2,743 847898 2267872 
2/21/2014 2,733 2,731 855792 2278256 
2/28/2014 2,649 2,648 854054 2288453 
3.7.2014 2,79 2,788 859084 2295938 
3/14/2014 2,656 2,654 861640 2305795 
3/21/2014 2,744 2,743 864279 2311539 
3/28/2014 2,723 2,721 853179 2320653 
4.4.2014 2,723 2,721 855478 2326085 
4.11.2014 2,627 2,625 859981 2335991 
4/18/2014 2,723 2,721 860175 2341768 
4/25/2014 2,664 2,662 847034 2350272 
5.2.2014 2,586 2,584 849559 2354916 
5.9.2014 2,625 2,623 820137 2361328 
5/16/2014 2,525 2,523 824474 2367236 
5/23/2014 2,534 2,532 826853 2370724 
5/30/2014 2,478 2,476 814320 2378186 
6.6.2014 2,589 2,587 816849 2385801 
6/13/2014 2,605 2,603 816861 2391477 
6/20/2014 2,607 2,605 821260 2396972 
6/27/2014 2,536 2,534 808779 2404577 
7.4.2014 2,64 2,638 811565 2408506 
7.11.2014 2,518 2,516 810990 2410339 
7/18/2014 2,483 2,481 811002 2413616 
7/25/2014 2,467 2,466 800501 2420285 
8.1.2014 2,494 2,493 800522 2422566 
8.8.2014 2,422 2,42 802855 2427647 
8/15/2014 2,341 2,34 751222 2431395 
8/22/2014 2,404 2,402 755717 2435932 
8/29/2014 2,345 2,343 742262 2436986 
9.5.2014 2,46 2,459 742261 2440637 
9.12.2014 2,612 2,611 746714 2446572 
9/19/2014 2,576 2,574 746893 2448625 
9/26/2014 2,529 2,528 739908 2451736 
10.3.2014 2,436 2,434 741439 2454457 
10.10.2014 2,282 2,28 741433 2455345 
10/17/2014 2,195 2,194 742973 2459197 
10/24/2014 2,27 2,268 744464 2461580 
10/31/2014 2,337 2,335 729807 2461581 
11.7.2014 2,299 2,298 729810 2461602 
11/14/2014 2,322 2,32 700726 2461622 
11/21/2014 2,312 2,31 700729 2461645 
11/28/2014 2,166 2,164 693743 2461625 
12.5.2014 2,308 2,307 693735 2461560 
12.12.2014 2,083 2,082 693726 2461495 
12/19/2014 2,164 2,162 693716 2461420 
12/26/2014 2,252 2,25 686627 2461364 
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1.2.2015 2,112 2,111 686609 2461224 
1.9.2015 1,947 1,945 685517 2461084 
1/16/2015 1,839 1,837 693755 2460944 
1/23/2015 1,799 1,797 693727 2460804 
1/30/2015 1,642 1,641 687683 2460652 
2.6.2015 1,958 1,957 687652 2460490 
2/13/2015 2,052 2,05 658999 2460328 
2/20/2015 2,113 2,112 658967 2460167 
2/27/2015 1,995 1,993 649302 2460028 
3.6.2015 2,243 2,241 649278 2459908 
3/13/2015 2,116 2,114 649255 2459787 
3/20/2015 1,932 1,93 649232 2459666 
3/27/2015 1,963 1,961 637917 2459578 
4.3.2015 1,841 1,839 637939 2459693 
4.10.2015 1,949 1,947 637961 2459806 
4/17/2015 1,867 1,865 637983 2459920 
4/24/2015 1,91 1,909 638005 2460034 
5.1.2015 2,115 2,114 632974 2460182 
5.8.2015 2,15 2,148 633003 2460334 
5/15/2015 2,144 2,142 591648 2460486 
5/22/2015 2,211 2,209 591678 2460639 
5/29/2015 2,123 2,121 586944 2460749 
6.5.2015 2,409 2,408 586954 2460803 
6.12.2015 2,394 2,392 586965 2460857 
6/19/2015 2,259 2,258 586975 2460911 
6/26/2015 2,474 2,473 574120 2460975 
7.3.2015 2,384 2,382 574145 2461107 
7.10.2015 2,399 2,397 569285 2461238 
7/17/2015 2,349 2,347 569305 2461370 
7/24/2015 2,264 2,262 569324 2461502 
7/31/2015 2,182 2,18 563314 2461603 
8.7.2015 2,164 2,162 563327 2461694 
8/14/2015 2,199 2,198 525548 2461785 
8/21/2015 2,038 2,036 525562 2461876 
8/28/2015 2,182 2,181 522712 2461941 
9.4.2015 2,126 2,124 522712 2461943 
9.11.2015 2,19 2,188 522712 2461944 
9/18/2015 2,135 2,134 522712 2461946 
9/25/2015 2,164 2,162 514060 2461948 
10.2.2015 1,995 1,993 514054 2461911 
10.9.2015 2,09 2,088 514049 2461874 
10/16/2015 2,035 2,033 514043 2461837 
10/23/2015 2,088 2,087 514037 2461800 
10/30/2015 2,144 2,142 512967 2461760 
11.6.2015 2,327 2,325 512960 2461718 
11/13/2015 2,268 2,266 500542 2461676 
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11/20/2015 2,264 2,262 500535 2461628 
11/27/2015 2,222 2,22 494994 2461601 
12.4.2015 2,271 2,269 494992 2461589 
12.11.2015 2,129 2,127 494990 2461578 
12/18/2015 2,206 2,204 494988 2461566 
12/25/2015 2,243 2,241 494987 2461554 
1.1.2016 2,271 2,269 489219 2461505 
1.8.2016 2,117 2,116 489211 2461450 
1/15/2016 2,036 2,035 488387 2461396 
1/22/2016 2,054 2,052 488379 2461341 
1/29/2016 1,923 1,921 485029 2461269 
2.5.2016 1,837 1,836 485016 2461174 
2.12.2016 1,75 1,748 455956 2461080 
2/19/2016 1,747 1,745 462562 2461211 
2/26/2016 1,764 1,762 468542 2461152 
3.4.2016 1,876 1,874 468548 2461196 
3.11.2016 1,986 1,984 468555 2461239 
3/18/2016 1,875 1,873 468561 2461283 
3/25/2016 1,902 1,9 464882 2461326 
4.1.2016 1,772 1,771 474170 2461345 
4.8.2016 1,718 1,717 474174 2461368 
4/15/2016 1,754 1,752 474318 2461390 
4/22/2016 1,89 1,888 474322 2461413 
4/29/2016 1,835 1,833 479447 2461489 
5.6.2016 1,781 1,779 479465 2461605 
5/13/2016 1,702 1,7 441214 2461721 
5/20/2016 1,84 1,838 441232 2461637 
5/27/2016 1,853 1,851 449610 2461761 
6.3.2016 1,702 1,7 449634 2461897 
6.10.2016 1,642 1,64 449658 2462032 
6/17/2016 1,61 1,608 449682 2462168 
6/24/2016 1,562 1,56 447746 2462303 
7.1.2016 1,446 1,444 451851 2462427 
7.8.2016 1,36 1,358 451872 2462541 
7/15/2016 1,553 1,551 452290 2462652 
7/22/2016 1,568 1,566 452309 2462763 
7/29/2016 1,455 1,453 454273 2462865 
8.5.2016 1,59 1,589 454289 2462956 
8.12.2016 1,515 1,514 429152 2463447 
8/19/2016 1,58 1,578 429168 2463538 
8/26/2016 1,631 1,63 431098 2463645 
9.2.2016 1,604 1,602 431090 2463599 
9.9.2016 1,677 1,675 431082 2463553 
9/16/2016 1,694 1,693 431074 2463506 
9/23/2016 1,62 1,618 431066 2463460 
9/30/2016 1,596 1,594 433453 2463473 
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10.7.2016 1,72 1,718 433457 2463497 
10/14/2016 1,799 1,798 433461 2463520 
10/21/2016 1,736 1,735 433465 2463544 
10/28/2016 1,849 1,847 435165 2463586 
11.4.2016 1,778 1,776 435177 2463654 
11.11.2016 2,152 2,15 384699 2463722 
11/18/2016 2,357 2,355 395485 2463801 
11/25/2016 2,359 2,357 399648 2463861 
12.2.2016 2,385 2,383 399255 2463496 
12.9.2016 2,469 2,467 399261 2463531 
12/16/2016 2,593 2,592 399268 2463566 
12/23/2016 2,539 2,537 399275 2463601 
12/30/2016 2,446 2,444 402996 2463591 
1.6.2017 2,421 2,419 402988 2463548 
1/13/2017 2,398 2,396 405075 2463504 
1/20/2017 2,469 2,467 405066 2463462 
1/27/2017 2,486 2,484 407659 2463426 
2.3.2017 2,467 2,465 407661 2463436 
2.10.2017 2,409 2,407 363532 2463446 
2/17/2017 2,416 2,415 372215 2463456 
2/24/2017 2,313 2,312 376104 2463488 
3.3.2017 2,48 2,478 376137 2463650 
3.10.2017 2,576 2,575 376170 2463812 
3/17/2017 2,502 2,5 376203 2463974 
3/24/2017 2,414 2,412 376236 2464335 
3/31/2017 2,389 2,387 380988 2464454 
4.7.2017 2,384 2,382 381007 2464546 
4/14/2017 2,239 2,237 381191 2464638 
4/21/2017 2,25 2,248 381211 2464730 
4/28/2017 2,282 2,28 384939 2464792 
5.5.2017 2,351 2,349 384944 2464815 
5.12.2017 2,327 2,326 349054 2464638 
5/19/2017 2,236 2,235 349059 2464660 
5/26/2017 2,248 2,246 353768 2464696 
6.2.2017 2,161 2,159 353787 2464783 
6.9.2017 2,202 2,201 353806 2464871 
6/16/2017 2,153 2,151 353826 2464958 
6/23/2017 2,144 2,142 353845 2465046 
6/30/2017 2,305 2,304 357258 2465096 
7.7.2017 2,387 2,386 357263 2465121 
7/14/2017 2,334 2,332 357347 2465145 
7/21/2017 2,239 2,238 357353 2465170 
7/28/2017 2,291 2,289 361528 2465195 
8.4.2017 2,264 2,262 361534 2465221 
8.11.2017 2,191 2,189 312184 2465247 
8/18/2017 2,196 2,194 324394 2465273 
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8/25/2017 2,168 2,166 324365 2465300 
9.1.2017 2,169 2,166 325239 2465289 
9.8.2017 2,052 2,051 325435 2465468 
9/15/2017 2,204 2,202 325430 2465448 
9/22/2017 2,252 2,25 325425 2465427 
9/29/2017 2,335 2,334 328882 2465467 
10.6.2017 2,361 2,359 328902 2465554 
10/13/2017 2,275 2,273 328922 2465641 
10/20/2017 2,386 2,384 328941 2465727 
10/27/2017 2,408 2,406 329644 2459827 
11.3.2017 2,334 2,332 329680 2459985 
11.10.2017 2,4 2,398 292840 2456641 
11/17/2017 2,345 2,343 308286 2456822 
11/24/2017 2,344 2,342 308302 2456959 
12.1.2017 2,363 2,362 310425 2454474 
12.8.2017 2,378 2,376 310420 2454256 
12/15/2017 2,355 2,353 310416 2454237 
12/22/2017 2,483 2,481 310412 2454219 
12/29/2017 2,407 2,405 314035 2448208 
1.5.2018 2,478 2,476 314035 2448209 
1.12.2018 2,55 2,546 316716 2447009 
1/19/2018 2,661 2,659 316716 2447009 
1/26/2018 2,662 2,66 322166 2436211 
2.2.2018 2,843 2,841 322161 2436192 
2.9.2018 2,853 2,851 295684 2436173 
2/16/2018 2,877 2,875 300215 2432066 
2/23/2018 2,87 2,866 297846 2424242 
3.2.2018 2,866 2,864 297887 2424402 
3.9.2018 2,896 2,894 297929 2424562 
3/16/2018 2,846 2,844 297970 2424723 
3/23/2018 2,815 2,814 298012 2424883 
3/30/2018 2,741 2,739 296395 2413031 
4.6.2018 2,775 2,773 296322 2413060 
4/13/2018 2,828 2,827 308229 2413079 
4/20/2018 2,962 2,96 308277 2413218 
4/27/2018 2,959 2,957 304579 2395460 
5.4.2018 2,952 2,95 304602 2395528 
5.11.2018 2,973 2,97 290054 2386966 
5/18/2018 3,058 3,056 296104 2387035 
5/25/2018 2,933 2,931 288986 2387103 
6.1.2018 2,904 2,902 296172 2377872 
6.8.2018 2,948 2,946 296217 2377998 
6/15/2018 2,922 2,921 296261 2378124 
6/22/2018 2,897 2,895 296305 2378250 
6/29/2018 2,862 2,86 295992 2360377 
7.6.2018 2,824 2,822 296037 2360504 
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7/13/2018 2,829 2,827 296154 2359766 
7/20/2018 2,895 2,893 296199 2359893 
7/27/2018 2,956 2,954 296622 2336876 
8.3.2018 2,951 2,949 296639 2336925 
8.10.2018 2,875 2,873 258449 2324391 
8/17/2018 2,862 2,86 267171 2324540 
8/24/2018 2,812 2,81 267189 2324589 
8/31/2018 2,862 2,86 267464 2313202 
9.7.2018 2,942 2,939 267465 2313204 
9/14/2018 2,998 2,996 267466 2313206 
9/21/2018 3,065 3,063 267467 2313208 
9/28/2018 3,063 3,061 265763 2294210 
10.5.2018 3,235 3,233 265769 2294227 
10.12.2018 3,163 3,161 265775 2294245 
10/19/2018 3,194 3,192 265781 2294215 
10/26/2018 3,077 3,076 264095 2270399 
11.2.2018 3,214 3,212 264108 2270436 
11.9.2018 3,184 3,182 255606 2270420 
11/16/2018 3,065 3,063 263716 2253085 
11/23/2018 3,043 3,039 263727 2253117 
11/30/2018 2,99 2,988 264547 2240551 
12.7.2018 2,849 2,845 264567 2240606 
12/14/2018 2,893 2,889 264587 2240661 
12/21/2018 2,794 2,79 264607 2240717 
12/28/2018 2,722 2,718 260887 2222517 
1.4.2019 2,671 2,668 260849 2222412 
1.11.2019 2,703 2,701 260811 2220219 
1/18/2019 2,786 2,784 261168 2220115 
1/25/2019 2,76 2,758 259354 2220012 
2.1.2019 2,686 2,684 259314 2205713 
2.8.2019 2,638 2,634 259274 2205604 
2/15/2019 2,664 2,663 254819 2182201 
2/22/2019 2,655 2,652 254779 2182092 
3.1.2019 2,757 2,753 252449 2175420 
3.8.2019 2,632 2,628 252470 2175479 
3/15/2019 2,591 2,587 252492 2175537 
3/22/2019 2,443 2,439 252513 2175596 
3/29/2019 2,407 2,405 249157 2153308 
4.5.2019 2,497 2,495 249207 2153443 
4.12.2019 2,567 2,565 249260 2153409 
4/19/2019 2,563 2,56 262007 2153544 
4/26/2019 2,5 2,498 258659 2123954 
5.3.2019 2,527 2,525 258739 2124129 
5.10.2019 2,469 2,467 257102 2114444 
5/17/2019 2,393 2,391 266380 2114569 
5/24/2019 2,322 2,32 266461 2114744 
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5/31/2019 2,126 2,125 267697 2109785 
6.7.2019 2,084 2,081 267777 2109957 
6/14/2019 2,082 2,08 267857 2110084 
6/21/2019 2,057 2,054 267937 2110256 
6/28/2019 2,007 2,005 266427 2095393 
7.5.2019 2,036 2,034 266454 2095448 
7.12.2019 2,124 2,122 266685 2093984 
7/19/2019 2,057 2,055 266716 2094051 
7/26/2019 2,072 2,07 265728 2080700 
8.2.2019 1,849 1,845 265731 2080704 
8.9.2019 1,746 1,745 265734 2080710 
8/16/2019 1,556 1,554 289608 2088920 
8/23/2019 1,537 1,535 291712 2095130 
8/30/2019 1,499 1,496 295006 2095164 
9.6.2019 1,562 1,56 297554 2101169 
9/13/2019 1,899 1,896 297580 2105826 
9/20/2019 1,725 1,721 297606 2107683 
9/27/2019 1,685 1,68 302345 2117130 
10.4.2019 1,531 1,529 302408 2121485 
10.11.2019 1,732 1,729 302407 2123085 
10/18/2019 1,757 1,754 302406 2149188 
10/25/2019 1,798 1,794 302405 2175491 
11.1.2019 1,712 1,71 308578 2194318 
11.8.2019 1,943 1,942 310038 2201529 
11/15/2019 1,832 1,831 317309 2220361 
11/22/2019 1,772 1,771 317323 2248498 
11/29/2019 1,777 1,776 322057 2259853 
12.6.2019 1,84 1,836 322136 2282196 
12/13/2019 1,824 1,823 322172 2300678 
12/20/2019 1,919 1,917 322208 2328862 
12/27/2019 1,879 1,875 321591 2328933 
1.3.2020 1,79 1,788 324301 2347714 
1.10.2020 1,823 1,82 315612 2362635 
1/17/2020 1,823 1,821 315605 2381020 
1/24/2020 1,686 1,684 315598 2409108 
1/31/2020 1,508 1,507 319329 2427880 
2.7.2020 1,585 1,583 319315 2442621 
2/14/2020 1,588 1,585 325396 2451688 
2/21/2020 1,473 1,471 325382 2474060 
2/28/2020 1,152 1,149 326323 2502624 
3.6.2020 0,765 0,762 327906 2523031 
3/13/2020 0,968 0,96 357666 2640771 
3/20/2020 0,85 0,845 436318 2978372 
3/27/2020 0,682 0,675 509228 3340832 
4.3.2020 0,599 0,595 576918 3634386 
4.10.2020 0,724 0,719 621255 3788858 
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4/17/2020 0,645 0,642 659309 3909352 
4/24/2020 0,604 0,601 665596 3971419 
5.1.2020 0,616 0,612 675810 4020191 
5.8.2020 0,686 0,683 686628 4057268 
5/15/2020 0,646 0,643 711258 4089331 
5/22/2020 0,661 0,659 719915 4109512 
5/29/2020 0,654 0,653 719393 4134356 
6.5.2020 0,897 0,895 725316 4150409 
6.12.2020 0,707 0,703 729159 4169340 
6/19/2020 0,697 0,694 735883 4197404 
6/26/2020 0,643 0,641 732150 4213220 
7.3.2020 0,671 0,669 735426 4231355 
7.10.2020 0,648 0,645 738129 4253229 
7/17/2020 0,628 0,627 745867 4265878 
7/24/2020 0,59 0,589 746156 4293563 
7/31/2020 0,53 0,528 745463 4305651 
8.7.2020 0,566 0,564 754625 4320093 
8/14/2020 0,711 0,709 762621 4345544 
8/21/2020 0,631 0,628 771901 4358559 
8/28/2020 0,726 0,721 766933 4386637 
9.4.2020 0,72 0,718 770951 4393621 
9.11.2020 0,667 0,666 778237 4407005 
9/18/2020 0,697 0,694 787290 4431523 
9/25/2020 0,658 0,654 788868 4445477 
10.2.2020 0,704 0,701 797112 4469848 
10.9.2020 0,779 0,774 797937 4484978 
10/16/2020 0,747 0,746 805291 4509778 
10/23/2020 0,845 0,843 809323 4527186 
10/30/2020 0,875 0,874 812404 4538087 
11.6.2020 0,822 0,818 812450 4552731 
11/13/2020 0,9 0,896 824797 4584423 
11/20/2020 0,826 0,824 826697 4606580 
11/27/2020 0,841 0,837 829664 4614410 
12.4.2020 0,969 0,966 830650 4630538 
12.11.2020 0,9 0,896 832286 4662841 
12/18/2020 0,951 0,946 833243 4682881 
12/25/2020 0,928 0,923 827914 4688916 
1.1.2021 0,918 0,913 836876 4699421 
1.8.2021 1,119 1,115 843174 4723733 
1/15/2021 1,085 1,083 826150 4743552 
1/22/2021 1,089 1,086 834222 4766107 
1/29/2021 1,069 1,065 836802 4772074 
2.5.2021 1,167 1,164 845658 4798901 
2.12.2021 1,213 1,208 851747 4824057 
2/19/2021 1,341 1,336 858715 4844574 
2/26/2021 1,41 1,405 866624  
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3.5.2021 1,57 1,566   
 
 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis   
     
Date Total Federal Debt Total US Treasuries held by the Fed 
2007-07-01 9007653 786658 
2007-10-01 9229172 776570 
2008-01-01 9437594 706296 
2008-04-01 9492006 520016 
2008-07-01 10024725 479158 
2008-10-01 10699805 476367 
2009-01-01 11126941 474972 
2009-04-01 11545275 573745 
2009-07-01 11909828 723569 
2009-10-01 12311349 775355 
2010-01-01 12773123 776608 
2010-04-01 13201792 776835 
2010-07-01 13561622 785670 
2010-10-01 14025215 895235 
2011-01-01 14270114 1185961 
2011-04-01 14343087 1488714 
2011-07-01 14790340 1646411 
2011-10-01 15222940 1671434 
2012-01-01 15606518 1660243 
2012-04-01 15855037 1665291 
2012-07-01 16066240 1649845 
2012-10-01 16432730 1653312 
2013-01-01 16771381 1729275 
2013-04-01 16738320 1866165 
2013-07-01 16738180 2002152 
2013-10-01 17156119 2140136 
2014-01-01 17601227 2259937 
2014-04-01 17632606 2360108 
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2014-07-01 17824071 2426745 
2014-10-01 18141444 2459731 
2015-01-01 18152056 2460424 
2015-04-01 18151998 2460307 
2015-07-01 18150618 2461634 
2015-10-01 18922179 2461699 
2016-01-01 19264939 2461279 
2016-04-01 19381591 2461702 
2016-07-01 19573445 2463150 
2016-10-01 19976827 2463604 
2017-01-01 19846420 2463625 
2017-04-01 19844554 2464741 
2017-07-01 20244900 2465262 
2017-10-01 20492747 2459216 
2018-01-01 21089643 2434915 
2018-04-01 21195070 2393594 
2018-07-01 21516058 2333899 
2018-10-01 21974096 2265915 
2019-01-01 22027880 2198686 
2019-04-01 22023283 2126587 
2019-07-01 22719402 2093452 
2019-10-01 23201380 2209436 
2020-01-01 23223813 2482343 
2020-04-01 26477241 3967128 
2020-07-01 26945391 4332240 
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